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Russia in Serbia – soft power and hard interests
Marta Szpala
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on 16 October has demonstrated Moscow’s 
willingness to secure its interests in the Balkans and use Belgrade in its confrontation with 
the West. It seems, however, that Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities, 
which are reluctant to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has alrea-
dy gained a strong position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian 
natural resources and, in particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian 
elites and society. The traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result 
of a series of Russia-inspired, wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so suc-
cessful that a large part of society has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent 
with Serbia’s. 
Russia’s increasingly active policy towards Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the neighbo-
uring countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo – has been part of a larger 
plan aimed at hampering the integration of the Balkan states with the Euro-Atlantic structu-
res and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in the EU’s near neighbourho-
od. Russia’s policy is also becoming increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing 
support for Balkan countries’ European integration. 
The Western Balkans have not been a priority 
region for Moscow, especially compared with 
the area of the former Soviet Union. However, 
the Western Balkans remain significant for Russia 
for two reasons. Firstly, this is a territory of ongo-
ing rivalry between Russia and other global and 
regional actors (e.g. the USA and the EU), and 
secondly, a key region from the point of view of 
control over the energy supply routes leading to 
Europe and of the intention to strengthen Russia’s 
dominant position in the European energy sector1. 
In its policy towards the Balkans, Russia has 
been focusing mainly on relations with Serbia 
1 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 
of February 2013: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osn-
doc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d-
2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument
and the Serbian minorities in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo2. Russia’s 
underlying assumption is that the politics of 
Serbia, the region’s largest country surround-
ed by states which have large Serbian minority 
groups, is a guaranty of stability in the Western 
Balkans. Moscow utilises a series of instruments 
for exerting pressure on Belgrade – from the 
growing dependence on energy supplies to the 
support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo in the 
2 In the remaining states Russian influence has been much 
weaker because their dependence on Russian fuel and 
the volume of trade exchange with Russia are insignifi-
cant. Croatia is the only country to import large amounts 
of fuel from Russia, though this is done on the basis of 
spot contracts rather than long-term contracts. Exclud-
ing Croatia, the volume of trade between the Balkan 
states and Russia amounts to 1%– 1.5% of their total 
trade exchange.
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UN forum and Serbs in Serbia and in the neigh-
bouring countries which are the most vulnera-
ble to Russian influence. Therefore, Serbia has 
held a special place in Russian policy and, by in-
fluencing Belgrade, Moscow intends to secure 
itself the means of controlling the situation in 
the region. Simultaneously, Moscow has been 
developing contacts with Serbian minorities in 
order to directly influence the developments 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Kosovo, mainly by fuelling separatist ambitions. 
The intensification of Russia’s actions towards the 
region dates back to 2008. This was when Pris-
tina declared independence and Russia, which 
supported Serbia and failed to recognize Koso-
vo’s secession, gained control over the Serbian 
fuel company, NIS. Moreover, the consolidation 
of Vladimir Putin’s regime and the strengthening 
of the Russian economy at that time enabled Rus-
sia to pursue an active policy in the area reaching 
beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Moscow 
was becoming more and more determined to re-
gain its influence in the region, which had erod-
ed following the fall of the USSR due to Russia’s 
weakness. However, the geographical distance, 
weak commercial relations and years of neglect 
in developing this direction of foreign policy have 
resulted in a situation where Russia’s choice of in-
struments to expand its influence in the region is 
much more limited than that of the EU. Russia’s 
actions are becoming ever more effective, how-
ever, and an important portion of them involves 
applying a vast array of soft power measures to 
win or Serbian popular support. 
The energy sector 
and the economic promises 
The economic instruments of pressure applied 
by Moscow towards Serbia include Russian 
domination in the fuel and gas sector. In 2008 
the Russian Gazprom acquired the Serbian 
company NIS3, thereby gaining full control over 
3 In 2008 Russia acquired 51% of shares in NIS and in-
creased its ownership to 56% in the following years. 
the oil processing sector (the Panchevo and 
Novi Sad refineries) and a strong position in 
the distribution network (in 2012 the company 
had an 82% share in the fuel market and 38% 
in retail market4). The company has also taken 
over the only gas depot (Banatski Dvor) and has 
been granted a monopoly, on favourable terms, 
for the extraction of gas and oil in the territo-
ry of Serbia. An agreement on the construc-
tion of the South Stream gas pipeline has also 
been signed. Serbia has been dependent on 
the supply of fuel from Russia (98.81% of gas 
consumed by Serbia comes from Russia)5, car-
ried out by intermediary companies associated 
with Gazprom (e.g. the Yugorosgaz company).
Apart from the energy sector and oil and gas  im-
ports, Russia’s role in the Serbian economy has 
been insignificant. In 2005–2013 Russia invest-
ed 598.4 million euros in Serbia6, which is 4.5% 
of all foreign investments carried out over that 
period. Apart from the acquisition of NIS, there 
has been no significant inflow of large Russian 
investments to Serbia. The financial promises 
concerning e.g. the Beopetrol company acquired 
by LUKoil in 2000, have not been kept7, and the 
investments in NIS have been financed from 
4 M. Bijanić, Petroleum Industry in Serbia. The best year in 
company’s history, http://www.sinteza.net/files.php?-
file=analiza/2012-NIS.pdf
5 With gas accounting for 11.6% of the consumption of 
fuel in Serbia. http://www.energy-community.org/por-
tal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/MEMBERS/PARTIES/SERBIA 
6 Foreign Direct Investments in Cash - Net, by Country, 
2005–2013 (BPM5), http://www.nbs.rs/internet/en-
glish/80/platni_bilans.html 
7 Z. Mihajlović Milanović, Energy-Economic Relations Be-
tween Russia, the Neighbouring Countries and the Eu-
ropean Union: Energy Dependency and/or Interdepen-
dence, [in:] Russia Serbia Relations at the beginning of 
XXI Century, ed. Žarko N. Petrović, p. 158, 
http://www.isac-fund.org/download/Russia-Serbia-Re-
lations-at-the-beginning-of-XXI-Century.pdf
Apart from the energy sector and the im-
port of fuels, Russia’s role in the Serbian 
economy has been insignificant.
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the loan granted by Gazpromneft or from the 
company’s own funds. Similarly, the pronounce-
ments made during President Dmitri Medvedev’s 
visit to Serbia in 2009, concerning budgetary aid 
and infrastructural investments amounting to 
1 billion euros8 have not been realised either, 
despite having been repeated by Prime Minis-
ter Vladimir Putin during his 2011 visit (this time 
the estimated amount was 1 billion US dollars)9. 
In 2000 Serbia signed a free trade agreement 
with Russia involving the introduction of a pref-
erential 1% tax rate on specific product groups. 
Although the agreement has not been ratified by 
the Russian side, it is being upheld by Russia10. 
In 2013 Serbian imports from Russia amounted 
to 1.4 billion euros, making up 9.2% of the total 
import volume. On the other hand, the value of 
Serbian exports to Russia stood at 0.79 billion eu-
ros. Although the volume of Serbian exports to 
Russia have been growing, in the context of the 
increase in Serbia’s export figures the importance 
of the country’s trade with Russia has diminished 
(from 7.7% in 2012 to 7.3% in 2013)11. The EU 
and CEFTA remain Serbia’s main trade partners. 
The economic crisis has boosted the efficien-
8 Russian President Deepens Balkan Ties On Belgrade 
Visit, http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_President_
Seeks_To_Deepen_Ties_In_Belgrade/1856602.html
9 Putin: Russia remains Serbia’s ally, 23.03.2011, http://www.
b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=03&d-
d=23&nav_id=73400. The officially stated reason for failing 
to complete the investment plans has been the lack of the 
necessary documentation on the Serbian side. 
10 Russia deliberately choose not to ratify the agreement to 
keep laverege on Serbia. 
11 Statistical Release ST16-6, no. 198, 16.07.2014. 
http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/repository/docu-
ments/00/01/45/00/st16g072014e.pdf 
cy of the energy- and economy-related instru-
ments of or coercion used by Russia towards 
Serbia. In 2013 the problems with maintain-
ing budgetary liquidity convinced the Serbian 
government to seek a loan from Russia for the 
amount of 344 million euros, which would not 
be conditional on the introduction of econom-
ic reforms or savings plans. The loan has been 
granted, but on less favourable terms than the 
financial support offered e.g. by China12. Serbia 
has also a problem with paying debts for the 
gas (around 200 mln euro) and want to keep 
the price for gas on the lowest possible level. 
Moreover the Russian promises of investment 
and the question of access to the large Russian 
market started to play an important role in 
the government-promoted strategy of speed-
ing up economic development. In this context, 
the greatest degree of attention has been paid 
to the project for construction of the South 
Stream gas pipeline. It is intended to generate 
new jobs, provide inexpensive access to fuels 
and bring income from transit fees. 
Although the declared involvement of Russian 
capital in Serbia has so far not materialised in 
any large scale, pro-Russian commentators see 
Moscow as an attractive and essential partner 
of Belgrade, and the Serbian media frequently 
and willingly present Russian investment plans 
and development aid as a great opportunity for 
the country’s economy. Consequently, 47% of 
Serbs believe Russia to be the largest supplier 
of development aid to Serbia13.
Instruments of public diplomacy
The most important means of influence used 
by Russia to strengthen its position in Serbian 
society is Russia’s proximity, as well as the pos-
12 Russia has granted two loans to Serbia. In the case of the 
first one, the interest rate is 6M Libor + 2.95%, the other 
one – 3.5%. The interest rate of loans granted by the Chi-
nese Export–Import Bank is 3% and 6M Libor + 1.30%. 
13 European Orientation of the Citizen of the Republik of 
Serbia. Trends. http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/docu-
ments/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mn-
jenja/opinion_poll_14.pdf
47% of Serbs believe Russia to be the 
largest supplier of development aid to 
Serbia. In fact, 89.49% of funds comes 
from the USA and the EU, and the Russian 
contribution has not even been included 
in statistical reports.
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itive image of Russia and its policy14. The task 
of fostering the feeling of proximity and pro-
moting the Russian vision of the international 
situation and Serbian-Russian relations lies with 
a network of dedicated Russian institutions. The 
network has been expanded in recent years to 
provide support (including financial aid) to or-
ganizations and groups which favour Russian in-
terests. Branch offices of the organization Russ-
kiy Mir (the Russian World) and a representative 
office of the International Fund for the Unity of 
Orthodox Nations have been opened in Novi 
Sad and Belgrade (2005). In 2013 a representa-
tive office of the Russian Institute of Strategic 
Research (RISI) and a branch of the Russian For-
eign Cooperation Agency (the Cultural Centre 
Russian House) were established in Belgrade. 
Several Russian foundations operate in Serbia, 
including the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, 
the Strategic Culture Foundation, the Centre of 
National Glory, the Foundation of St. Andrew 
and the Fund for the Russian Necropolis in Bel-
grade, created especially for Serbia15. Serb lan-
guage versions of Russian news portals have 
been created, often with a comprehensive sec-
tion devoted to local political affairs. They are 
prepared mainly by Russian state institutions 
such as the news channel RT (www.vostok.rs), 
the Voice of Russia broadcasting network 
(www.glasrusije.rs), various Russian foundations 
14 In the entire area of the Balkans, Russia is perceived 
through the prism of its support for the independence of 
Slavic nations, and because of the geographical distance 
and the familiarity of the Communist regime Russia is not 
seen as a threat or a state which forces certain measures 
on its smaller neighbours. The positive image of Russia 
has been confirmed in opinion polls. In Serbia 55% of the 
respondents approve of Russia’s actions, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska inhabited by Serbs the 
level of support is 59%, and 57% in Montenegro. Balkan 
views of a multipolar world; http://balkanfund.org/
15 In recent year there has been an increase in the number of 
events sponsored by Russian organizations and funds. The 
events included the Young Leaders Forum in Novi Sad, the 
exhibition devoted to 48 victims killed in Odessa clashes, 
the world premiere of a film directed by Nikita Mikhalkov, 
the Russian Culture Days, the Russian Film Days. The Rus-
sian authorities have sent at least three humanitarian aid 
convoys to victims of May 2014 floodings. These events 
have received extensive coverage in the mainstream media. 
such as the Strategic Culture Foundation (www.
strategic-culture.org) and groups associated 
with the Russian Orthodox Church (www.pra-
voslavie.ru). The major Serbian daily newspaper 
Politika and the monthly Geopolitika contain 
supplements Ruska Reč and Rusija i Srbija, pub-
lished by Rossiyskaya Gazeta as part of the Rus-
sia Beyond the Headlines project. Russian orga-
nizations and funds also support the actions of 
domestic far right and Eurosceptic organizations 
(Dveri, Naši), political parties (Treća Srbija) and 
non-governmental organizations with an ideo-
logical profile favoured by Moscow (e.g. Srbski 
Kod, Beogradski Forum za Svet Ravnopravnih). 
The actions of Russian organizations and the 
media, as well as the Serbian counterparts as-
sociated with them, focus on several thematic 
areas. First, they promote the Russian version of 
the international situation, e.g. the current cri-
sis in Ukraine, or the re-interpretation of histo-
ry according to Moscow’s interest in the spirit 
of support for the long-term Russian-Serbian 
alliance. Second, they attempt to discredit the 
Western cooperation structures (NATO, the EU) 
claiming that they operate against Serbia’s inter-
ests (e.g. in the case of the EU – by supporting 
the separatism in Vojvodina) and pose a threat 
to global peace and stability. Third, they present 
Russia as Serbia’s closest ally, whose actions are 
always consistent with the interests of the Bal-
kan partner, and as an attractive partner with 
a strong position in the global arena, a thriving 
economy and fascinating culture. Common as-
pects of Serbian and Russian history are also 
emphasised, in particular the tradition of fight-
ing shoulder-to-shoulder in the two world wars. 
Fourth, they criticise the pro-European actions 
Russia is principally determined to chal-
lenge Serbia’s EU integration plans and 
the process of reconciliation in the region, 
carried out under the auspices of the EU.
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of the current government. In this context, Ser-
bia’s pro-European aspirations are presented as 
an example of the “Stockholm syndrome”. Ac-
cording to them, Serbia, as a country repeated-
ly humiliated by the EU states, has decided to 
become a part of its “tormentor”, i.e. the EU, to 
the detriment of its society. Fifth, they provide 
constant reminders of the disputes, the conflict 
victims and the real and imaginary damages 
suffered by Serbs and inflicted on them by their 
neighbours. Sixth, they present Russia as a state 
upon which the economic development of Ser-
bia depends. An analysis of the message spread 
by the organizations associated with Moscow 
suggests that Russia is mainly determined to 
challenge Serbia’s EU integration plans and the 
process of reconciliation in the region, carried 
out under the auspices of the EU, claiming that 
these initiatives are contradictory to Serbian 
state interests. It also seems that Russia intends 
to foster close cooperation between Belgrade 
and Moscow, promoting it as the most natural 
project from the perspective of the develop-
ment of the two states. 
Moscow’s Serbian allies 
The actions carried out by Moscow in Serbia 
have received support from groups which are 
hostile towards the idea of the country’s EU 
membership, rather than overtly pro-Russian. 
Among these groups are the oligarchs who 
have built their position by undertaking unlaw-
ful actions and using their political ties (e.g. in 
the energy sector). For them, the introduction 
of EU regulations would mean losing their influ-
ence and, more often than not, criminal liabili-
ty. Another significant group are the conserva-
tive and anti-liberal circles associated with the 
Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) which consid-
ers the EU a threat to traditional Serbian values. 
Frequently emphasised in this context is the op-
position towards the liberal West, which in the 
Balkans promotes principles contradictory to 
the “Slavic” system of values. In neighbouring 
Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the SOC is fighting for supremacy 
over the orthodox churches of these states; it 
questions these countries’ independence, sup-
ports Serbian nationalist organizations in their 
attempts to regain the “Serbian territories” and 
fosters plans to maintain Serbian influence in 
this region via a network of church organiza-
tions. Thus, the actions of the SOC seem to be 
consistent with the Russian policy of aiming to 
perpetuate ethnic tensions in the region. In his 
conversation with Vladimir Putin during his vis-
it to Moscow in 2013, the SOC Patriarch Iriney 
criticised Serbian authorities’ policy towards 
Kosovo as being pursued under EU pressure, 
and solicited support for the actions of the SOC 
in Macedonia and Kosovo. According to the 
Patriarch’s words, “the Church can only count 
on support from God and from Moscow”16. 
Serbia’s integration with the EU has also been 
a fear factor for certain groups in the security 
sector associated with the old regime, as they 
could be made accountable for war crimes. The 
aim of all these groups has been consistent 
with the Russian aim – they intend to block the 
introduction of EU regulations in Serbia. 
Serbian minorities as a tool
Russia’s actions in the Balkans include intensi-
fication of the relations with the Serbian mi-
nority in neighbouring states – mainly in Bosnia 
16 http://www.kurir-info.rs/irinej-kod-putina-nadamo-se-
u-boga-i-rusiju-clanak-909257
The strengthening of Russia’s influence in 
the Serbian diaspora enables Moscow to 
influence the internal situation and the sta-
bility of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, and Kosovo, and is an element of pres-
sure exerted on the authorities in Belgrade.
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and Herzegovina, as well as Montenegro and 
Kosovo. The strengthening of Russian influence 
in the Serbian diaspora has two aims. Firstly, it 
enables Russia to influence the internal situa-
tion and the stability of these states. A good 
example here is provided by the propagation of 
anti-NATO attitudes among Serbs living in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, which 
has resulted in blocking the integration of these 
states with the Alliance. Furthermore, it has 
been an element of pressure exerted on the au-
thorities in Belgrade. Any strengthening of sep-
aratist aspirations among the Serbs could pose 
a threat to the current policy of Belgrade, which 
is determined to develop cooperation with the 
region’s states – which in itself is a condition for 
making progress in the EU integration process. 
The right-wing Serbian government, support-
ed mainly by a nationalist-oriented electorate, 
would have to respond to the separatist ambi-
tions of the Serbian diaspora. 
The strengthening of Russia’s influence in the 
Serbian diaspora enables Moscow to influence 
the internal situation and the stability of Mon-
tenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, 
and is an element of pressure exerted on the 
authorities in Belgrade. 
Russian influence is strongest in Republika 
Srpska (RS) – one of the two entities making 
up Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moscow is closely 
cooperating with Milorad Dodik, the President 
of RS. The support granted by Russia to Serbian 
politicians in BiH has been one of the factors 
blocking the reform of the extremely ineffi-
cient political system in this country, and fur-
ther deepening the divisions between the three 
BiH nations – the Serbs, the Bosniaks and the 
Croats. Russia has offered its support, includ-
ing financial support17, for Dodik’s attempts to 
gain maximum independence from the central 
authorities in Sarajevo. An example of this sup-
port has been the invitation extended by the 
17 In 2014 Russia granted a 72 million euros loan to Repub-
lika Srpska to help it maintain its budgetary stability.
Russian side to Milorad Dodik to travel to Bel-
grade to take part in a meeting with Vladimir 
Putin during his visit to Serbia in October 2014. 
The invitation was used by Dodik in his elec-
toral campaign before the general elections in 
BiH. This was also a clear signal suggesting that 
Belgrade’s influence on the relations of Serbian 
politicians in BiH with Moscow is diminishing. 
This appears to be contrary to the policy pur-
sued by Belgrade which wishes to act like an 
intermediary between Banja Luka and Russia 
and to weaken the position and independence 
of Dodik himself. 
On a smaller scale, Russia has also granted sup-
port to Serbs in Kosovo, aiming to torpedo the 
peace plan calling for normalization of the re-
lations between Belgrade and Pristina and to 
include Serbs in the Kosovan institutional sys-
tem. One example of such actions has been the 
initiative of the Russian embassy in Belgrade 
concerning the signing of a petition to the Rus-
sian government to grant Russian citizenship to 
Serbs living in Kosovo. The petition’s aim was 
to disrupt the negotiations carried out by Bel-
grade with the government in Pristina; it has 
been signed by 20,000 Serbs18. As part of oth-
er initiatives, Russia has sent humanitarian aid 
convoys to Kosovo and emphasised the dramat-
ic situation of the Serbian minority in the prov-
ince, claiming that it has been left without the 
necessary support and attention by Belgrade. 
EU membership on Russian conditions? 
Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić has 
decided to continue the two-track policy initi-
ated in 2008 by President Boris Tadić of pursu-
ing EU integration while  simultaneously main-
taining close relations with Russia. In January 
2014 Serbia opened EU accession negotiations, 
and the government has announced a plan to 
carry out quick reforms in order to fulfil the EU 
18 Srpska Zajednica na Kosovu, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/
serbian/doc/Srpska%20zajednica%20na%20Kosovu.pdf 
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membership criteria within five years. Yet Rus-
sia’s ambassador in Belgrade, Aleksandr Che-
purin, had already stated in 2013 that Serbia’s 
EU membership should not be devised so as to 
hamper the country’s long-term close relations 
with Russia, as these should be Belgrade’s prior-
ity19. As the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated, 
the deepening of cooperation both with Brus-
sels and Moscow will be difficult, if not impos-
sible, in the long term. Serbian authorities have 
not joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia, al-
though Serbia as a candidate country should be 
harmonising its foreign and security policy with 
the EU’s actions. The Serbian-Russian agree-
ments on visa abolition, trade preferences or – 
most importantly – the rules of cooperation in 
the energy sector and the agreement  on the 
construction of the South Stream gas pipeline 
will need to be renegotiated, which is against 
Russia’s interests. Serbia has already been criti-
cised by the Energy Community for its failure to 
introduce energy regulations directly aimed at 
breaking the monopoly of Russian companies 
on the Serbian market. The restructuring of the 
state-owned company Srbijagas, managed by 
pro-Russian politicians, has been hindered due 
to pressure from Moscow. 
The development of military cooperation be-
tween Serbia and Russia is likely to be another 
problem for partners from the EU and NATO. 
After a long period of military cooperation with 
NATO within the Partnership for Peace pro-
gramme, Serbia has been intensifying its coop-
eration with Moscow in this area since 2011. In 
that year a Regional Humanitarian Centre was 
established in Niš, where, for example, Russian 
sappers are stationed. Due to its strategic loca-
tion it might be considered a bridgehead of the 
Russian military presence in the region. In 2013 
Serbia and Russia signed a military cooperation 
agreement and Serbia joined the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an ob-
19 Serbia’s NATO membership - “red line for Russia”, http://
www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&m-
m=11&dd=27&nav_id=88482
server state and the only non-CIS participant20. 
The authorities in Belgrade are trying to bal-
ance the deepening of cooperation with Mos-
cow by intensifying the relations with NATO. In 
September 2014 it was announced that Serbia 
would sign an Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP) shortly. However, the military pa-
rade with the participation of Russian soldiers 
in Belgrade, the planned Srem 2014 Serbi-
an-Russian military exercises of airborne troops 
near the Croatian and Hungarian border in the 
period when Moscow is carrying out military 
operations in Ukraine, bring Serbia’s credibility 
into question in the context of its cooperation 
with the Western states21. 
Prospects 
Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belgrade carried a large-
ly symbolic meaning. Its aim was to strengthen 
the pro-Russian groups within the ruling elite 
and in society, as well as to confirm that Serbia 
lies within Russia’s zone of influence. The Serbi-
an side has failed to gain any concessions from 
Russia22, and the signed agreements concern 
matters of secondary importance or serve the 
purpose of strengthening the Russian presence 
in Serbia23. 
It is not inconceivable that if tensions between 
the EU and Russia continue to grow, and as 
a consequence pursuing a friendly policy to-
wards the two partners becomes impossible, 
the Serbian government would have to drop 
the EU integration project under pressure from 
20 Apart from Afghanistan. 
21 Cf. M. Robinson, With a parade for Putin, Serbia walks 
a tightrope, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/
uk-serbia-russia-eu-idUKKCN0I30CA20141014
22 The Serbian authorities have solicited for the consent to 
raise the tax on the extraction of minerals, eliminate in-
termediaries from the trade in gas, introducing export 
quota for Fiat carsetc. 
23 Although seven agreements, memorandums and proto-
cols  have been signed, they concern mostly the per-
formance of agreements already in force. The contents 
of the only agreement which could considerably change 
the relations between Moscow and Belgrade, concern-
ing the guarantee of the extraterritorial status of the 
Russian military base in Niš, has not been revealed.
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Serbian society, persuaded by the pro-Russian 
and anti-EU circles that the revision of relations 
with Russia, carried out on the EU’s demand, is 
not favourable for Serbia. This is all the more 
important as public support for EU member-
ship has declined to 51% (in December 2013)24. 
According to a survey conducted in October 
2013 by the conservative organization NSPM, 
67.5% of Serbs support their country’s alliance 
with Russia, whereas 53.7% opt for Serbia’s 
membership of the EU25. In this context, the 
declaration made by Prime Minister Aleksandar 
Vučić during President’s Putin visit, stating that 
Serbia is grateful to Russia for respecting its 
sovereign decision to opt for European integra-
tion, should be considered as a request rather 
than as gratitude. 
The attempts to block the Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration of the Balkan states have been directly 
related to the rivalry between Russia and other 
actors for influence in the region. The weaker 
24 European Orientation of the Citizen of the Republic 
of Serbia. http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/
nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/
opinion_poll_14.pdf
25 http: //www.mc.rs /upload/documents/prezentaci-
je/221113_NSPM_Juzni-tok_Srpsko-ruski-odnosi.pdf
and more feuding the Balkan states are, the 
more vulnerable they will be to Russian influ-
ence. In this context, Moscow’s aim is to sab-
otage EU efforts focused on introducing dem-
ocratic principles and the rule of law, building 
strong state institutions and a liberal economic 
system, as well as fostering reconciliation in 
the region. Moscow’s actions are designed to 
challenge the attractiveness of the EU’s politi-
cal and economic model and to encourage Ser-
bia to choose another integration project, one 
that is promoted by Russia (CSTO, the Customs 
Union). If the Serbian authorities decide to de-
velop closer cooperation with Russia at the cost 
of the country’s integration with the EU, this 
would be a strong blow to the EU concept of 
fostering stabilization in the Western Balkans. 
In such circumstances, Belgrade would most 
probably return to conducting a revisionist pol-
icy towards its neighbours, which would repre-
sent a threat to the entire region.
